A recent study has shown that illusory inversion of temporal order can be induced by the 'intentional binding' of an action with its consequence, and that this is associated with increased activation in a brain area implicated in conflict monitoring.
Elizabeth Liddle 1 and Stephen R. Jackson 2 Most actions require precise timing: for example, we calibrate our sensorimotor system in such a way that the end point of an action occurs at the time we intend. This is true for the tennis player or musician and was likely true for our hunting ancestors -the salient moment is not when we initiate an action, or even when the motor action itself is completed, but the time at which its goal is achieved. Changing circumstances, however, require that this system be continuously recalibrated so as to provide an accurate estimate of sensorimotor delays. For instance, different materials, lighting conditions or acoustic environments will each modulate the time that elapses between the initiation of an action and the arrival of sensory feedback. Moreover, the brain must be selective about what, from a barrage of sensory input, is worthy of further investigation, and one such filter is likely to involve the computation of a 'forward sensory model' that provides an estimate of the sensory consequences of our own actions [1, 2] . If this estimate is confirmed by afferent sensory information, then we need not spend additional resources on further processing. But if there is a mismatch between the model's prediction and afferent sensory information, then we may be alerted to investigate further [3] .
Stetson et al.
[4] recently investigated the effect of the 'intentional binding' of an action to a consequent stimulus on the perception of temporal order. Haggard et al. [5] had earlier shown that, as an action and its apparent result become causally bound, the time period perceived to elapse between the two events is compressed: intention and goal appear to become one. In contrast, arbitrary pairings of action and stimulus produce no such temporal compression. Intentional binding would seem, therefore, to involve the temporal elision of action and goal.
While it is relatively easy to see how such elision might arise from processes that prioritise the temporal precision of the endpoint of action, it is less obvious how such elision might be represented neurally. One model of this process might be that the intention to act 'resets' a single 'clock', bringing the representation of the action into temporal alignment with the representation of its result. An alternative model might be that this recalibrated timeline is maintained alongside a 'baseline' timeframe representing a more veridical sequence of events.
[4] sought to quantify the magnitude of temporal sensorimotor recalibration observed in a simple motor learning task, and to determine, using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), whether the brain activation associated with sensorimotor recalibration supported the hypothesis of a single 'clock' that was recalibrated, or whether it favoured the existence of multiple time estimates. The authors asked participants to make a key-press following a cue, under two conditions ( Figure 1) .
In a baseline condition, for the majority of trials, a brief visual stimulus ('flash') was presented very shortly after the key-press; in a second condition, an additional interval of 100 milliseconds was 'injected' between the response and the flash. In both conditions, in the remaining minority of trials, the flash occurred randomly. Participants were asked to report which had occurred first: their key-press, or the flash. From their responses, the authors computed the 'point of subjective simultaneity' -the point in time at which each participant experienced the flash occurring at the same time as the key press -for each condition.
In the baseline condition, the point of subjective simultaneity tended to be at around the time at which most of the flashes were presented. In other words, participants appeared to assume that their own action was 'completed' at around the time at which, in most trials, the flash appeared. In the 'injected delay' condition, however, the point of subjective simultaneity was, on average, also delayed, not by the full 100 milliseconds but by a substantial proportion of that interval.
This finding indicates that participants recalibrated the timeline of events in the 'injected delay' condition in such a way that their perception of time between their actual response and the expected consequence of that response was compressed but not eliminated. Interestingly, when longer delays were 'injected', the magnitude of the recalibration was reduced, suggesting that, as the probability of a direct causal link between response and flash was stretched, intentional binding was attenuated.
Of greatest interest, however, is the finding from the fMRI data. Stetson et al.
[4] postulated that, if the sensorimotor recalibration involved a comparison between a 'baseline' timeline and a conflicting recalibrated one, brain activity in anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), an area associated with conflict monitoring [6], should be observed. Such activation would be less likely were the recalibration process simply to involve the resetting of a single 'clock'. They therefore contrasted the fMRI BOLD signal associated with trials in which the participant illusorily perceived the flash as having occurred before the response, with that associated with trial types in which the perception was veridical. These were, firstly, trials in which the flash was presented in the same time window but after the response, and, secondly, trials in which the flash was actually presented before the response. In both contrasts, significantly greater activity was observed in an area of anterior cingulate and medial frontal cortex corresponding to that implicated in conflict monitoring.
This result is of immense interest, as questions remain as to whether ACC activation is specific to error monitoring or to a more general monitoring of conflict [6, 7] . In this experiment, ACC activation was indeed associated with an illusory, and thus 'erroneous', percept of temporal order, although there was no reason to suppose that the participants had any subjective experience of error. The finding therefore suggests that the ACC is implicated, not only in monitoring conflict of which the participant is aware, but in the production of illusions subjectively perceived to be correct. In particular, it suggests ACC involvement in processes by which conflicting representations of temporal order arising from sensorimotor recalibration are resolved.
Questions then arise as to the role of the ACC in this process. One possibility is that the ACC serves to maintain the neural activity representing alternative models The participant makes a key-press following a cue. On 60% of trials, a flash follows the key-press by a fixed time interval; on the remaining trials, the flash is randomly presented either earlier or later. In the 'baseline' condition (upper part of the figure), the fixed time interval for the 60% of trials is 35 milliseconds after the key-press, while in the 'injected delay' condition (lower part of the figure), the fixed time interval is increased by 100 ms. Participants are asked to report whether the flash occurred before or after their key-press, and from their responses, their 'point of subjective simultaneity' (PSS) is computed (grey arrow); flashes presented before the PSS are perceived as having occurred 'before' the key-press (shown as dotted arrows); flashes presented after the PSS are reported as having occurred after the key-press (solid arrows). In the baseline condition, the PSS was only slightly delayed, and most flashes were reported veridically. In the 'injected delay' condition, the PSS was substantially delayed, resulting in an illusory reversal of temporal order for many trials. Trials in which this illusion was perceived were associated with increased activation in a brain area associated with conflict monitoring. In contrast to many of the other 'omics' -proteomics, transcriptomics, metabolomics and so forth -epigenomics does not simply enhance genome sciences, but instead challenges the concept of the linearity between genome and phenotype ( Figure 1) . Definitions of epigenetics vary in the literature and range from Waddington's original description of the complex development of embryos (in contrast to preformationism) [8] , to current usage such as ''the transmission of information not coded in DNA sequences from cell to daughter cell or from generation to generation'' [9] . In all cases, epigenetics enables a single genome to give rise to multiple phenotypes because of processes that are not simply encoded within the DNA sequence of the genome. Our growing appreciation of the role of epigenomics is evidenced by the dramatic increase in use of the term in recent literature (Figure 2) . Ciliate genomes are shaped by epigenetic processes. Like animals, ciliates have two distinct genomes: the germline micronucleus and the somatic macronucleus. In ciliates, however, both of these types of nuclei are contained within a single cell, rather than being sequestered into specific tissue types. The generation of the macronuclear genome in ciliates is driven, at least in part, by a genome-scanning process in which an RNA interference-based mechanism 'scans' the zygotic nucleus and the parental macronucleus to shape the newly developing macronucleus [10] . In T. thermophila, this processing is relatively limited, yielding w225 chromosomes in the somatic macronucleus from five canonical eukaryotic chromosomes in the micronucleus [6, 11] . In other ciliate lineages, this epigenetic processing is more extensive and can generate a macronucleus with w25,000,000 gene-sized 'chromosomes' [12, 13] .
Analysis of the complete T. thermophila macronuclear genome sequence provides further evidence of genome scanning, as there is no evidence of any transposable elements in the macronucleus, even though transposable elements are found in available fragments of micronuclear DNA [6] . This suggests that genome scanning has removed foreign DNA that is present in the T. thermophila germline micronucleus. Full appreciation of the role of genome scanning in ciliates will 
